Case in Point
Tue, 29 Sep 2009 12:51:00
Paralysis May Paralyze Federal Courts
Shomo v. City of New York
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 13
Few issues divide the Courts and the U.S. Congress more than the propriety and desirability of prisoner litigation. There is a predictable ebb and flow with Congress and state legislatures limiting litigation, and then judges finding new exceptions to keep the cases coming.
Unfortunately for New York legislators, there is a new exception to report. It comes from the ongoing medical problems of José Shomo, a guest of the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC) from 1999 to 2001.
During Shomo’s incarceration, doctors diagnosed him with right-arm paralysis and limited use of his left arm, which left him unable to eat, use the restroom, dress himself or perform basically any daily activity. Rather than transfer him to an infirmary, officials left him in the general population, where Shomo claimed he was forced to pay other inmates to assist him.
In 2003, Shomo sued the DOC and several doctors who allegedly failed to treat him, claiming cruel and unusual punishment for not providing medical treatment. The trial court dismissed his claims, finding it was either barred by the three-year statute of limitations or the claims were not strong enough to constitute medical indifference.
Last month, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and allowed Shomo’s case to proceed. For the first time, the court applied the “continuing violation” doctrine to a prisoner’s claim of medical indifference.
The decision allows Shomo to sidestep many of the statute of limitations problems he previously faced. Since Shomo’s allegations stemmed from 1999 but he had not sued until 2003, many of his claims should have been barred. With the continuing violation doctrine, however, the limitations period for Shomo did not begin until the last allegedly illegal act occurred, in 2001. The result is that for many New York state prisoners, the decision will lengthen the statute of limitations by several years.
When One Day In Jail is Too Long
United States v. Ray
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 27
In 1991, Sheena Ray pleaded guilty to 31 counts of mail fraud after making false claims to an insurance company garnered her and three others over $200,000. She was due to be sentenced on May 8, 1992, but, for unknown reasons, the court hearing was delayed.
Living free without any word from the federal court for the next 15 years, Ray carried on a normal life on Long Island, raising children, attending college, and free of further legal trouble. Then, in 2007, she applied to be a claims examiner with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. When she contacted the courthouse for records on her 1992 conviction, she unwittingly alerted the government that she had been free the whole time.
After several month of wrangling with prosecutors over an appropriate sentence, a judge sentenced Ray to one day in prison and six months in a halfway house. The judge, in fact, faulted Ray for not promptly returning to be sentenced.
On appeal, the Second Circuit threw out the sentence, finding it violated her due process rights to a speedy trial. The appeals court poignantly noted, “Just as a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, he has no affirmative duty to aid in the execution of his sentence.” Saying the sentence actually threatened Ray’s rehabilitation more than aided it, the judges remanded the case to the district judge for another review.
Judges Immune From Money-Hungry Lawyers
Bliven v. Hunt
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 28
Public defenders are notoriously underpaid. Most are poorly compensated because there are just too many criminals for the small sum allotted by the state. While this conventional explanation satisfies most, David Bliven saw a different story. To Bliven, a former public defender in Queens, the low pay was the result of a conspiracy by Queens County Family Court judges directed at him.
Under the Queens County attorney assignment plan, public defenders are appointed to represent indigent litigants and compensated based on the type of service rendered and hours worked (usually $75 per hour). The ultimate decision on how much any attorney receives is at the discretion of a judge based on an attorney’s request for fees.
Bliven became dissatisfied when his requests were, on multiple occasions, reduced by an average of $100 per submission. He sued three judges and those who worked for them, alleging a conspiracy to deny him fees as retaliation for his aggressive litigation tactics. Bliven claimed that because he made motions that required additional work by the judges, they were retaliating against him.
Last month, three federal judges decided that the three judges in Queens (and their aides) were absolutely immune from Bliven’s lawsuit. Long-time federal Judge Amalya Kearse wrote that, in awarding fees, “the court performs a judicial function” not subject to second-guessing in a private lawsuit. The court found that awarding fees was more than a mere administrative decision, for which a judge could be sued.
The Second Circuit drew comparisons to the decisions made by federal judges applying federal fee-shifting statutes. In doing so, the court emphasized that judicial immunity applies equally to state family court judges as it does to Supreme Court justices, freeing all in the judicial system from vexatious and frivolous litigation, even in Queens.
Shomo v. City of New York
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 13
Few issues divide the Courts and the U.S. Congress more than the propriety and desirability of prisoner litigation. There is a predictable ebb and flow with Congress and state legislatures limiting litigation, and then judges finding new exceptions to keep the cases coming.
Unfortunately for New York legislators, there is a new exception to report. It comes from the ongoing medical problems of José Shomo, a guest of the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC) from 1999 to 2001.
During Shomo’s incarceration, doctors diagnosed him with right-arm paralysis and limited use of his left arm, which left him unable to eat, use the restroom, dress himself or perform basically any daily activity. Rather than transfer him to an infirmary, officials left him in the general population, where Shomo claimed he was forced to pay other inmates to assist him.
In 2003, Shomo sued the DOC and several doctors who allegedly failed to treat him, claiming cruel and unusual punishment for not providing medical treatment. The trial court dismissed his claims, finding it was either barred by the three-year statute of limitations or the claims were not strong enough to constitute medical indifference.
Last month, the Second Circuit reversed the trial court and allowed Shomo’s case to proceed. For the first time, the court applied the “continuing violation” doctrine to a prisoner’s claim of medical indifference.
The decision allows Shomo to sidestep many of the statute of limitations problems he previously faced. Since Shomo’s allegations stemmed from 1999 but he had not sued until 2003, many of his claims should have been barred. With the continuing violation doctrine, however, the limitations period for Shomo did not begin until the last allegedly illegal act occurred, in 2001. The result is that for many New York state prisoners, the decision will lengthen the statute of limitations by several years.
When One Day In Jail is Too Long
United States v. Ray
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 27
In 1991, Sheena Ray pleaded guilty to 31 counts of mail fraud after making false claims to an insurance company garnered her and three others over $200,000. She was due to be sentenced on May 8, 1992, but, for unknown reasons, the court hearing was delayed.
Living free without any word from the federal court for the next 15 years, Ray carried on a normal life on Long Island, raising children, attending college, and free of further legal trouble. Then, in 2007, she applied to be a claims examiner with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. When she contacted the courthouse for records on her 1992 conviction, she unwittingly alerted the government that she had been free the whole time.
After several month of wrangling with prosecutors over an appropriate sentence, a judge sentenced Ray to one day in prison and six months in a halfway house. The judge, in fact, faulted Ray for not promptly returning to be sentenced.
On appeal, the Second Circuit threw out the sentence, finding it violated her due process rights to a speedy trial. The appeals court poignantly noted, “Just as a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, he has no affirmative duty to aid in the execution of his sentence.” Saying the sentence actually threatened Ray’s rehabilitation more than aided it, the judges remanded the case to the district judge for another review.
Judges Immune From Money-Hungry Lawyers
Bliven v. Hunt
Decided by: Second Circuit Federal Appeals Court, Aug. 28
Public defenders are notoriously underpaid. Most are poorly compensated because there are just too many criminals for the small sum allotted by the state. While this conventional explanation satisfies most, David Bliven saw a different story. To Bliven, a former public defender in Queens, the low pay was the result of a conspiracy by Queens County Family Court judges directed at him.
Under the Queens County attorney assignment plan, public defenders are appointed to represent indigent litigants and compensated based on the type of service rendered and hours worked (usually $75 per hour). The ultimate decision on how much any attorney receives is at the discretion of a judge based on an attorney’s request for fees.
Bliven became dissatisfied when his requests were, on multiple occasions, reduced by an average of $100 per submission. He sued three judges and those who worked for them, alleging a conspiracy to deny him fees as retaliation for his aggressive litigation tactics. Bliven claimed that because he made motions that required additional work by the judges, they were retaliating against him.
Last month, three federal judges decided that the three judges in Queens (and their aides) were absolutely immune from Bliven’s lawsuit. Long-time federal Judge Amalya Kearse wrote that, in awarding fees, “the court performs a judicial function” not subject to second-guessing in a private lawsuit. The court found that awarding fees was more than a mere administrative decision, for which a judge could be sued.
The Second Circuit drew comparisons to the decisions made by federal judges applying federal fee-shifting statutes. In doing so, the court emphasized that judicial immunity applies equally to state family court judges as it does to Supreme Court justices, freeing all in the judicial system from vexatious and frivolous litigation, even in Queens.
